

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Strategic Challenges for NATO

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ABSTRACT

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NATO has been very proactive in assessing and re-assessing the possible threats in and around Europe and the USSR. The Partnership for Peace Program, Russian-NATO Council, and Mediterranean Dialogue are recent initiatives to ensure regional stability. By taking this forward-looking approach, NATO's mission to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area remains valid. The Washington Treaty of 1949 remains a relevant document. NATO has effectively expanded its mission and continues to have a positive stabilizing influence within the original NATO countries. Additionally, NATO's ability to promote democracy has fostered in many former Soviet Bloc countries. This enhances NATO's ability to demonstrate the virtues of democracy and assist with the development of new governments and militaries.

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NATO RELEVANCY

This Strategy Research Paper will discuss the relevancy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) in 2003 and its requirement to remain relevant in the future. This analysis starts with a brief history of NATO and its mission and then reviews its performance since 1994. A comparison of NATO's charter mission versus recent and current NATO operations followed by advantages for the United States accruing from continued NATO relevancy.

World War 1(WW1) and World War 2(WW2) dominated the first half of the twentieth century. Both of these wars started in Europe and drew an initially reluctant United States into the conflict. As a direct result of the wars, the European continent suffered extensive damage to its infrastructure and economic base. The United States authored and implemented the Marshall Plan to help Europe regain its economic base and rebuild. The Marshall Plan was only one step in the complex and continuous role the US would play with Europe between WW2 and 2003.

The soldiers and citizens who served or lived in Europe witnessed unimaginable carnage and death. Both World Wars took an enormous toll of human lives. No one wanted to experience that level of loss of life and destruction again. After the war, most European countries downsized their militaries and focused on rebuilding their national infrastructure and economy.

Between 1945 and 1949, the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), on the other hand, maintained her military at full strength and pursued expansionist policies. There was concern from the United States and Europe that the USSR would not respect "the international settlements reached at the end of the war"¹ among which was the United Nations Charter. This environment bonded many European countries and North America and led to discussions centered on a cooperative agreement. This agreement hopefully would help reduce the possibility of a repeat of the level of war witnessed previously, and prevent any war for the signatories. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1942 and its incorporation into the Soviet Bloc provided a powerful impetus toward implementation of a collective security agreement.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949 and is the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.² Countries included were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Canada, and the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty is often referred to as the

1949 Washington Treaty and came into force after ratification by the twelve countries on 24 August 1949.

This collective security pact states that an armed attack against one nation would be considered an attack against all and the other signatories of the treaty would assist, militarily if necessary, the attacked nation to maintain stability and security in the North Atlantic region. The treaty also upholds individual country rights and international responsibilities in regard to the United Nations Charter thereby creating a regional alliance within the umbrella of the UN.³

NATO AND THE USSR

Some argue that the fall of the USSR completed the mission of NATO and NATO should therefore disband. Others argue destabilizing conditions still exist in the region and NATO should continue to provide its stabilizing influence. This second argument often includes expanding NATO by inviting nations who demonstrate the values of living in peace with all peoples and promoting stability in the European-Atlantic area to join the organization.

The first argument is shortsighted as the Treaty signers agreed to:

...reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.⁴

Although the destabilizing entity in the North Atlantic Treaty area was initially the USSR, the collapse of the USSR did not in itself create or safeguard freedom, democracy, or individual liberty in the region. Historians may end up concluding NATO's Phase One was complete when NATO stood up and persevered through the deflation of the USSR threat. The NATO mission continues to be to "promote stability and well-being in the area."⁵ Phase Two for NATO may be promoting democracy throughout Europe, especially in the former USSR countries and WARSAW Pact states, and may also include an expanding NATO influence outside of what many consider the proper boundaries of Europe and the North Atlantic area.

EUROPEAN UNION (EU) HISTORY

The initial treaty, which is the foundation for today's European Union(EU) was founded on the plan of French businessman, Jean Monnet, in an "effort to pool European coal and steel

production under a common authority.⁶ French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced this plan in May 1950. The European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC)Treaty was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951 by France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. This agreement would contribute to the post-WW2 economic recovery, but was initially limited in scope to the control of the two key manufacturing materials. This resulted in an increase in the coal and steel trade among the six nations by 129 percent over the next five years.⁷

The amount of influence the US had in Europe during the Cold War was substantial as the US provided the bulk of the forces and leadership to deter an USSR invasion. The forty years of the Cold War allowed both the US and Europe to work together against a common enemy. It was easy to focus on and establish military, diplomatic, and economic priorities. Part of the reason for this is the partnership had recently endured the horrors of two world wars and these thoughts, images, and sacrifices were fresh and created lasting memories.

The conclusion of the Cold War quickly reduced the immediate threat of attack from Russia and her fellow Warsaw Pact countries. As time passed, memories of WW2 and the perceived Soviet threat continued to diminish in the eyes and minds of many Europeans and Americans. The financial cost of collectively winning the Cold War had been substantial. The fall of the USSR also allowed European and US military forces and government officials to review the size and capabilities of their military forces. The downsizing of the US military in general, and the downsizing of US military forces in Europe specifically, continued to reduce the ability of the US to influence decisions in European sphere. This peaceful environment allowed Europe to continue evaluating and assessing the US's role in a post-Cold War Europe. Additionally, the EU analyzed its role, both on the continent and internationally. It took some time for the EU to get organized after the Cold War, but now it seems to have gained momentum and is redefining interests and priorities. The EU continues to mature and appears to be taking on more of a "European first" mentality in its decisions. This also appears to reduce US influence in the region.

Several other treaties have been signed by the EU since 1951. The treaty on European Union, ratified in Maastricht, Netherlands in November 1993 was key in creating a renewed EU focus. This treaty is seen as a major overhaul and a blueprint to achieve an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), more developed political dimension and expanded cooperation in judicial and maintenance of order matters. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 and the Treaty of Nice in December 2000 continued the Maastricht reforms and prepared the EU for further

enlargement. Currently there are fifteen European Union members with plans to expand to twenty-seven by June 2004.⁸

Not surprisingly, composition of the EU Parliament is based on the population of a country.⁹ Germany, France, Spain, and Britain, have the greatest number of EU Parliament representatives. They currently have ten votes each which will increase to twenty-nine each when the EU grows to twenty-seven members. Likewise Luxembourg will grow from two to four votes and new member Malta will have the fewest votes with three of the 237 total votes.¹⁰

Two key decisions made by the EU were the need for and introduction of a common currency, the euro, in 1999 which has completely replaced the national currency in the twelve EMU countries.¹¹ The EU also decided to establish a European Union military force called the Rapid Reaction Force(RRF), with a projected strength of 60,000, deployable within sixty days and sustainable in the field for one year. This RRF would be capable of conducting Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Response operations.¹² The EU also plans to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions of conflict prevention and crisis management in the Balkans and elsewhere by 2003.¹³

With a common currency and a military force with force projection capability, the EU appears to be seeking to attain regional primacy and may have aspirations on gaining a larger voice in international affairs.

RUSSIA

The importance of continually reassessing the mission, structure, and execution are what ensures NATO remains relevant. NATO adheres to this philosophy as evidenced by its eastward expansion and by enhancing cooperation with Russia.

The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, at the May 2002 signing of the Rome Declaration stated, "neither the nuclear missile potentials nor the Cold War-era commitments can any longer be or are the panacea for modern threats."¹⁴ The first and only time NATO declared itself under attack and invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was not in response to an attack by the USSR/Russia, but was rather in response to an attack by a common NATO and Russian enemy which occurred on 11 September 2001. In fact, since the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Russia has quickly stepped up to fight a common enemy. Russia had long thought the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Al Q'aida terrorist organization were the major causes of instability along Russia's southern border. The Al Q'aida was also thought to promote radical rebel groups in Chechnya.¹⁵ With a common enemy, the NATO and Russia began to foster a relationship.

On 13 September 2001, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which was also known as the nineteen plus one, for the nineteen NATO countries plus Russia, released a “strong-worded joint statement denouncing inhuman terrorist attacks¹⁶ and indicated a readiness for NATO and Russia to fight terrorism jointly. The relationship has grown from the formal, rigid structure of the previous PJC, to a more equal partnership. The new partnership inaugurated in Rome, is the Russia – NATO Council(RNC). The nineteen plus one is now called The Twenty Nations, all on equal footing.

This partnership does not give Russia NATO membership, or allow Russia to veto NATO decisions. In fact, “the new formula of Russia – NATO relations was stripped of issues relating to both the functioning of the Washington Treaty and Russia's sovereign right to provide for its own military security and build up relationships with its military allies.¹⁷ This new relationship establishes an understanding of the importance of NATO and Russia discussing common interest and key topics prior to decisions being made.

Part of this relationship is a focus on combating terrorism. An area, though, which will take more dialogue and time to solve, is Russia's reaction and concern on the expanding NATO membership, especially as to countries with a common border with Russia. Attempts are being made to reassure Russia this NATO expansion is not in response to a real or perceived Russian military threat. It is another attempt to further stabilize the region in everyone's interest, and to promote democracy and free trade. Other key discussion areas are peacekeeping and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁸

EU/US PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES

As the European Union continues to mature and define itself we can readily notice differences between US and EU policies, plans, and ideas. The International Criminal Court(ICC), the Kyoto Protocol on environmental issues, the ban on anti-personnel land mines, the biodiversity treaty, and the verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Control Treaty are all supported by the EU and not fully supported by the US.¹⁹

The US per capita energy consumption is twice as much as the EU and this, combined with the US refusal to sign the Kyoto protocol, which establishes measures to reduce greenhouse gases, adds fuel to the European Union concern about the perception of a difference between US rhetoric and practice. The fact that none of the European countries have met their Kyoto emission reductions is often obscured behind this anti-US rhetoric.²⁰ The amount of press and newspaper coverage on these topics is an example of continued interest in

focusing on differences in EU and the United States thoughts and policies rather than common interests.

The current non-support for UN resolution 1441 to invade Iraq, if Iraq does not fully disarm and cooperate fully with UN inspectors, which was originally passed unanimously,²¹ is another indicator of friction between France, Germany, and Belgium and the US. France and Germany have effectively partnered to stymie US and international efforts. The negative effects of non-UN support range from retaliation on countries who do authorize a military attack to elimination of specific attack courses of action due to basing or territorial flyover or port of entry limitations placed on coalition forces by non-supportive countries.

Differences in philosophies continue to be used to drive a wedge between the US and key EU members, particularly France and Germany. Some see this as reason for the European Union to beef up their military organization and ensure it can effectively operate autonomously without a US dominated NATO.

NATO EXPANSION/NATO'S FUTURE

Since 1949, NATO has maintained an open attitude toward expanding membership and remains open to further expansion. NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson stated it clearly, "we must no longer cling to the past. And that applies very much to NATO. Had the Alliance remained focused on the threats of the past, it would long ago have withered away."²² NATO has grown from the original twelve countries to the current nineteen countries. In addition to the original signers, Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. West Germany was unified with East Germany in 1990 and this union is recognized and under the protection of NATO.²³ NATO admitted the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999 via the Partnership for Peace(PfP) program as explained on page 11.

Adding countries to the NATO Alliance brings the region closer to attaining the NATO founders' vision of a free and united Europe. There is also consideration in expanding NATO invitations to the Ukraine, some countries in Central Asia and others in the Mediterranean basin. Additionally, NATO discussions with Russia and the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council offer Russia an enhanced opportunity to form a closer relationship with NATO to foster security and other common goals.²⁴

The United States must remain in NATO and continue to push for NATO expansion. This is important in three ways. First, it allows the US to maintain a critical link with the original NATO countries and remain relevant in European affairs. Second, NATO expansion augments the NATO team with quality assets who might otherwise revert to anti-NATO philosophies.

Third, NATO enhances the ability of the US to continue training with European military forces and increase the proficiency of all involved.

There are other threats in the North Atlantic area to which NATO is currently responding to promote regional stability. With the breakup of the USSR there are fledgling countries who have a choice to continue under Communism or consider other forms of government. These countries could easily destabilize the North Atlantic area. As a new country determines its destiny and form of government it could often use a helping hand in its decisions and in executing them. NATO is in an excellent position to continue demonstrating the advantages of democracy and provide this help. One of the ways NATO provides help is the PfP program.²⁵

NATO, since 1994, has provided opportunities for North Atlantic Cooperation through the PfP program. The aim of the PfP program is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe by focusing on defense related cooperation. Jointly developed (NATO and the PfP country) individual partnership programs are designed to go beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership between that nation and NATO. The aim of the PfP program is to assess a country's military structure, forces, and capabilities. These normally encompass military to military exercises, exchanges, and conferences which are conducted primarily in the PfP country, but can also be conducted in other European countries or the United States.

The major advantage of conducting these in the PfP country is exposure to the culture, language, and training conditions of that country's military. This also allows an assessment of the logistics, transportation, and support functions. Additionally, it provides US officers and non-commissioned officers(NCOs) the ability to demonstrate firsthand their professional relationship with one another and with host country military and civilian leadership. This will enhance a country's ability to more readily work with current NATO forces and increase opportunities to become a member of NATO.

All states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and states participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) were given PfP program invitations. There are currently twenty-seven PfP participants. As previously stated, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were the first graduates of the PfP program, having gained NATO membership in 1999.²⁶

NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, which started in 1994, is another part of the Alliance's transformational agenda. Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, and Algeria are involved with NATO in this grouping which conducts political discussions, cooperative activities, and promotes common interests. A key benefit of the Mediterranean Dialogue is to "help dispel misconceptions and build confidence."²⁷ These countries are not currently included in the PfP

program, but are included in other NATO training activities. These activities are focused and designed to create relatively rapid training results. Training topics include: “military education, training and doctrine; defense reform and defense economics, counter-terrorism; border security; civil emergency planning.”²⁸ NATO announced in November 2002 the decision to “upgrade substantially the political and practical dimensions...as an integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security.”²⁹

Recent destabilizing threats in the North Atlantic region include Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) and Kosovo. NATO is currently playing a critical role in both. NATO received a mandate from the UN in December 1995 to implement military aspects of the Bosnian Peace Agreement which was signed in Dayton, Ohio, during November 1995. This encompassed adding US forces to an already in place UN organization. The UN mission was under scrutiny and Europe was neither prepared nor resourced to take on the BH mission. The US took the lead and was the driving force, alongside the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), in creating a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR).

Most UN forces who were in BH applied for inclusion to the IFOR mission. These forces were evaluated against a NATO standard and were either invited to stay, given minor deficiencies to correct, or were not accepted and returned to their parent country. The US provided the bulk of new forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. US involvement in BH started the first part of December 1995 and NATO assumed the IFOR mission later in the month of December. IFOR command and control was the ARRC headquarters which was commanded by British Lieutenant General Walker. The percentage of US military forces on the ground versus overall military ground forces was as high as one-third. After the IFOR completed a year on station it was replaced with another NATO led organization called the Stabilization Force(SFOR). This transition included a change in the country providing overall command and control from the United Kingdom to the US.³⁰

SFOR continues to provide stability and security in the BH region and was the template to design the Kosovo Force(KFOR), another NATO-led force to protect the Kosovar people and further enhance regional peace. Specifically included in UN Resolution 1244, dated 10 June 1999, regarding the Kosovo mission are: deterring renewed hostilities; maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire; demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); and ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for the task.³¹

The BH force has been conducting operations for over seven years while KFOR has been operating for over three years. The execution and duration of these two recent operations provide a snapshot of NATO’s professional reputation gained over a span of fifty-three years.

Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War countries are still interested in joining NATO, not leaving it. The NATO reputation in fostering stability is so good that other regions of the world, specifically Africa, would like to have NATO come and assist with training their national and regional forces.³²

The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)(10th SFG(A)) executed a training program for a period of a little over a year with Georgia, a former USSR country. Elements of 10th SFG(A) made several deployments and maintained personal ties with key members of the Georgia military as part of an integral program to develop the Georgian NCO corps. This training focused on small unit tactics, NCO duties and responsibilities, leadership traits and patrolling. This training mission continues today, using other US forces as trainers.³³

Similarly elements of 3^d SFG(A) were given the task of “standing-up” the Afghani Army about one year ago and have completed numerous training iterations. Afghanistan does not have any real hope of joining the EU, because of her geographical location, lack of an established government, and poor economy. However, Afghanistan could very likely align closer to NATO, become a strong US ally, and a stabilizing country strategically located between Iran, Pakistan, and the former USSR “stans” to the north. Key to the initial training of the Afghani Army was the corps of US NCOs who took the time to understand the culture, language, and backgrounds of many of the different Afghani tribes and groups. Their firm patience was key in meeting requirements to quickly establish the foundation of the Afghani Army. This was done with Afghani recruits who had never before been exposed to a westernized and professional officer and NCO corps.³⁴

Another NATO effort in Afghanistan is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, and the Netherlands have completed or are scheduled to take on the leadership role in assisting the Afghan government in restoring security in Kabul, the capital, and surrounding areas. The ISAF mission will continue as the Afghans continue to train and prepare to take over the security and law and order missions within their country.³⁵

The NATO summit held in Prague in November 2002 had an agenda summarized as “new capabilities, new members, new relationships.”³⁶ There are currently nine countries seeking NATO membership through the Membership Action Plan (MAP). These aspirant countries have democratic governments and are demonstrating their determination and ability to defend the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The MAP provides structure and guidelines to aid candidate countries in attaining NATO membership. MAP includes Albania and Macedonia.

The expansion of the area of NATO influence will continue to increase as technologies evolve, populations continue to migrate, and telecommunications continue to advance. These all allow a faster, almost instantaneous flow, of current news information and will enhance the ability of current events to have an almost immediate impact on people around the world. The world will continue to evolve and the distribution of information to people will increase. Therefore, countries have a much larger area of interest and area of impact than when NATO was formed. In fact, technology is advancing a generation in about eighteen months and this figure will continue to decrease over time. To remain relevant one must be able to influence those around you and be able to quickly evaluate and respond to events occurring in your area of interest.

The ability of the US military to establish and maintain solid, reoccurring, and face-to-face contacts, conferences, and exercises is the best way to influence nations who are either undecided about their future type of government or need reinforcement concerning a democratic form of it. With a program of regular interaction the US can positively influence the development of a country's military and drive home the advantages of a professional force operating under democratic principles.

The US has a tremendous amount of resources, which given different scenarios, could be rank ordered in a number of different ways. There is one exception to this prioritization and that is the American people will always be our greatest resource. We influence other countries in a number of different ways, sometimes monetarily, other times diplomatically. When we really want to send a message we normally send our NCOs and officers who are the epitome of the American culture. They set the example, walk the walk, and outperform their peers from any other nation.

Lord Robinson has stated: "As NATO is changing, so must the NATO-Russia relationship."³⁷ The first steps to change a relationship which was dominated by antagonism, military build-up, and a disagreement of basic human fundamentals is being pushed by both sides. Even after the collapse of the USSR and the destruction of the Berlin Wall the NATO-Russia relationship remained distant. It took the attack of 11 September 2001 to "throw the old baggage overboard once and for all."³⁸ The first phase of psychological transformation, putting the past behind us, has already succeeded.

NATO AND EU MILITARY FORCES

NATO is also transforming its military capability. This includes advanced technology, more flexible, smaller, faster, interoperable, and sustainable forces which include land, sea, and air elements capable of rapid response. This is called the NATO Response Force and will have an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) no later than October 2004 and a Full Operational Capability (FOC) by October 2006. The NATO Response Force will have two strategic headquarters(HQ), one functional, the other operational. The operational HQ is based in Belgium and includes two Joint Forces Commands (JFCs). Each JFC is capable of establishing a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and a smaller sea-based CJTF.³⁹

Military operations are one area where the importance of timely, precise, and clear orders are essential for mission success. As NATO expands it is imperative to maintain a military command and control HQ which facilitates timely, precise, and clear operational concepts and execution orders.

Combined operations are often more difficult than joint or unilateral operations because many times the civilian or military leadership of the country providing military assets retains approval authority for what types of missions, or in some cases when, where, and how their forces may be employed. This could be a simple case of only providing medical personnel for the Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Enforcement phases of a mission. A country supporting the Coalition could also provide combat forces, but require mission specific information prior to each and every part or phase of a plan.

This control could require another approval process, outside of the established civilian coalition leadership, where a nation is briefed and approval sought, for each particular use of its forces. The additional time and resources required for the elements to conduct these briefings distracts from the primary mission and inhibits military planners and commanders from knowing beforehand which forces are available for the mission. It will usually increase the planning time. This in turn reduces the decision maker's ability to rapidly respond to changing conditions on the battlefield. Finally, it promotes the perception of a country not trusting the coalition leadership, military and/or civilian, and not being fully committed to the cause.

The European Union RRF and NATO Reaction Force should complement one another. It is yet to be seen how NATO and the EU will man these two new force requirements. With constant scrutiny on European defense budgets, most of which are shrinking, it will require creative leadership and energetic promotion to meet the new requirements. By 2005, it is projected that nineteen of the twenty-five NATO countries will also belong to the EU.⁴⁰ An early course of action for cash-strapped countries is to attempt to have the same military forces wear

multiple hats. Three hats are immediately apparent as individual country, NATO, and EU priorities.

Attempting to have the same force man both the EU and NATO mission will be difficult. The EU limits its force to the Petersburg missions which include Peacekeeping, Peace Making, Crisis Management and Humanitarian Assistance.⁴¹ The NATO force will train for the full spectrum of missions to include combat operations.

There are reports the EU will take over the BH police mission at the end of 2003.⁴² This plan is still in draft, but does consider NATO support, particularly in logistics and communications capabilities. This will be an excellent opportunity to reassess the issues associated with transitioning from NATO to non-NATO units. The mission will be the first real test of the Rapid Reaction Force(RRF).

CURRENT NATO AND EU ISSUES

On at least two occasions(WW1 & WW2) in the 20th century Europe demonstrated it could not take care of itself and the US had to intervene. Some argue that the multi-faceted operations in the Balkans are an example of Europe being unable to handle its own problems. What has changed? Should the US stand down and allow Europe to take on responsibilities which she has not demonstrated she can handle? Using the standard crawl, walk, run process one would think there is still a requirement to do more fundamental level training. Let us not handoff a responsibility to an entity which has proven to not be up to the task.

Does the EU have an unstated mission of becoming a united Europe capable of competing with the US as a regional hegemon? Is the real reason Europe wants the European Union to grow and prosper is to eventually supplant NATO and further reduce the US influence in Europe? Could a EU theme be to garner anti-US sentiment both within and outside of the EU to further an anti-US agenda? The European Union could argue the EU is the voice of the post Cold War, the voice of the present, and also the voice of the future. The EU could further argue NATO has had over 50 years of good service, but Europe is united now and no longer needs the NATO umbrella. Also, Europe has matured and needs to shed more of the US influence so Europe can come into her own. The EU could additionally argue as long as the US is around the European Union will never be able to attain its full capability and potential.

At what point do European countries make the decision to support either the EU or NATO, but not both? The cost of maintaining sufficient military personnel and equipment to support both missions will eventually lead to resourcing discussions on which effort will have the priority.

In addition to the prioritization decision, countries may attempt to assign one force for both missions, which will create constant friction between competing requirements and the likelihood that either mission will not be resourced adequately. The course of action to multi-hat one force to take on EU, NATO and National requirements is also very short-sighted and will more than likely produce a force which is not particularly proficient in any of the missions.

The decision by the EU to become a larger player in Europe, or to decrease the voice of the US in European decisions should take into account the current NATO role. The decision will include the European Parliament, common European culture, a common currency, and an EU which has functioned for five, ten, or even twenty years alongside NATO. In this example, the EU will have been able to gain all the advantages of training with NATO forces, to include sharing technology advances and participating in major force projection exercises. The European Union could conclude it has fully developed the same level of proficiency, structure and technologies as NATO and to further the EU role.

Will the European Union, after years of NATO training and cooperation, choose to have NATO disband and the EU take on the European defense role? Unlike NATO, the US does not have a voice in the EU. The United States does not attend EU meetings, even in a non-voting or listen-only status. The US finds out what happened in the EU meeting by using one of its two press passes for the post-meeting press conference.⁴³ This restricts the US' ability to present or defend United States concerns and plans. It also limits the US knowledge of EU trends and how they intend to pursue certain issues.

As the EU continues to mature and define its missions and desired capabilities, there will be other areas where limited resources are prioritized against competing interests. We also witness today, especially with France and Germany, ideas and concepts contrary to those of US leadership. Recently the EU issued a press release directed toward member countries "to implement or back-up with vigor our policy."⁴⁴ The subject of the statement was the use of military force in Iraq. Is this the harbinger of EU versus US or EU versus NATO policies, plans, or visions? Conflict often brings about unique solutions to complex problems, which in the long run, works to the benefit of all. As in the debate on military action in Iraq, these decisions can take an extended period of time, with confrontational dialogue, and rarely attain one hundred percent consensus. This will continue to occur and it is imperative we continue an open dialogue; however, the US must retain its ability to pursue national objectives.

The United States must also prepare for countries to not support every US effort. The scenario we are witnessing today with Turkey could easily become more common in the future. The Turkish government echoed the will of the Turkish people and voted against allowing

additional US forces on Turkish soil.⁴⁵ This reduces US and coalition infiltration and basing options for an invasion of Iraq. Having more of these options increases the areas the enemy has to monitor and defend and increases chances of a successful invasion. This limiting of options makes it even more important to expand NATO membership to increase military basing, overflight rights, transiting, and port of entry options.

CONCLUSION

NATO's mission to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area remains valid. The Washington Treaty of 1949 remains a relevant document. NATO has effectively expanded its mission and continues to have a positive stabilizing influence within the confines of the original NATO countries and as it expands continues to be "resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security."⁴⁶ NATO continues to accomplish this mission through professionally conducted operations and increased regional alliances through a structured membership expansion program.

NATO's ability to continue to assess and identify factors which create instability within Europe is key to remaining pertinent. North Atlantic Treaty Alliance's ability to counter these factors with a unified and rapid response will require constant evaluation of its membership, structure, and interests. This vision and forward-looking attitude will ensure NATO relevancy. NATO acknowledges the shared interest they have with the EU and their commitment to enhance NATO-EU cooperation. NATO also recognizes the requirement to find solutions which are amenable to all parties and promote genuine strategic partnership.⁴⁷

Let us not allow the EU have an opportunity to challenge a stagnant NATO and continue to transform and expand NATO, which is successful and relevant; yet open to new membership and ideas. We should continue to assist the European Union in growing, especially by training with her military forces and bringing them to a level where they can better defend themselves and be more easily incorporated into operations alongside NATO and US forces.

Additionally, the growing role of the EU, with a European perspective on international issues, a common currency, and a dedicated military force will continue to take on a larger role in European and international issues. The US ability to have a voice and maintain the ability to effectively shape a region it is historically aligned with and has sacrificed many lives in its defense is tied directly to NATO remaining relevant.

WORD COUNT = 6,050

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² , The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO Basic Document, available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2002.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The European Union: A Guide for Americans, European Union, Delegation of the European Commission, (n.p, n.d.), 3.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 10.

¹² Prague Summit Declaration; 21 November 2002; available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2003.

¹³ The European Union, 30.

¹⁴ "A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy, and International Relations," International Affairs 48 (October 2002): 28.

¹⁵ George Islay MacNeill Robinson, "Russia: Security and Prosperity on the European Continent in the 21st Century," NATO speech, Moscow, European Business Club, 9 December 2002; available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021209a.htm>>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2003.

¹⁶ "A Russian Journal ...," 25.

¹⁷ Ibid., 28.

¹⁸ Prague Summit Declaration.

¹⁹ Jessica T. Matthews, "Estranged Partners," in Regional Strategic Appraisals, AY 2003, vol. 2, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, December 2001), 197.

²⁰ Ibid., 200-201.

²¹ Turkish Embassy. "Press Releases," May 2003, available from <<http://www.turkishembassy.org/pressreleases/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2003.

²² Robinson, 2.

²³ NATO Handbook, "Partnership for Peace," Chapter 3, available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2002.

²⁴ Marc Grossman, "New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships," NATO Review Summer 2002; available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue2/english/art2.html>>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2002.

²⁵ NATO Handbook, "Partnership for Peace."

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ NATO Resolution 1244, available from <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/ducu/u990610a.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2002.

²⁸ Grossman.

²⁹ Prague Summit Declaration.

³⁰ NATO Handbook, "The Wider Institutional Framework for Security," Chapter 15; available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/201/hb1501.htm>>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

³¹ Ibid.

³² The information in this paragraph is based on remarks made by a speaker at the United Nations, New York City, on 12 Oct 2002 to the US Army War College class of 2003.

³³ The information in this paragraph is based on personal involvement in Implementation Force (IFOR) and Sustainment Force (SFOR).

³⁴ The information in this paragraph is based on personal involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom.

³⁵ Prague Summit Declaration.

³⁶ Grossman.

³⁷ Robinson.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Prague Summit Declaration.

⁴⁰ The information in this paragraph is based on remarks made by a speaker in the Regional Studies Appraisal- Europe, February 2003.

⁴¹ International Institute For Strategic Studies Staff, "Military Balance, 2001-2002," in Regional Strategic Appraisals, AY 2003, vol. 1, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, December 2001), 219.

⁴² The information in this paragraph is based on remarks made by a speaker in the Regional Studies Appraisal- Europe, February 2003.

⁴³ The information in this paragraph is based on remarks made by a speaker in the Regional Studies Appraisal- Europe, February 2003.

⁴⁴ The information in this paragraph is based on remarks made by a speaker in the Regional Studies Appraisal- Europe, February 2003.

⁴⁵ Turkish Embassy, "Press Releases," April 2003; available from <<http://www.turkishembassy.org/pressreleases/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2003.

⁴⁶ The North Atlantic Treaty.

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